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51 
When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force 
Without Prior Security Council Authorization? 
Thomas M. Franck* 
I. THE CHARTER LAW PERTAINING TO STATES’ AUTONOMOUS USE 
OF FORCE 
By Article 2(4) the United Nations’ Charter sets out its principal 
rule. It requires all states to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of 
force”—not just to renounce war, but all other forms of interstate 
violence. 
This commitment is balanced, however, by the Charter’s equally 
fundamental promise to provide an effective system of collective 
measures to protect states against violators of the peace. This 
promise, unfortunately, has not been kept. The scheme setting out the 
promise is elegant. Article 39 authorizes the Security Council 
(Council) “to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Article 42 empowers it to 
“make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 25 
requires all members of the United Nations (UN) “to accept and carry 
out” those decisions. Article 42 further authorizes the Council, if 
milder remedies fail, to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” To that end, Article 43 commits all members “to make 
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and 
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security.” None of these 
provisions has been implemented in practice. 
The noble plan for replacing state self-help with collective 
 
 * Murry & Ida Becker Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Studies, 
New York University School of Law. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 51 Franck.doc  12/20/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 5:51 
 
 
security failed because it was based on two wrong assumptions: first, 
that the Security Council could be expected to make speedy and 
objective decisions as to when collective measures were necessary; 
and second, that states would enter into the arrangements necessary 
to give the Council an effective policing capability. 
The first of these assumptions simply was taken for granted on the 
strength of the wartime cooperation among allied powers. The 
drafters of the Charter—those same allied powers—decided, in their 
planning for a new global system, not even to try to define what 
might constitute a “threat to, or breach of the peace” or act of 
aggression. Instead, they assumed that this could be left safely to 
future case-by-case interpretations by a willing and able Council.1 
The second assumption, that states would provide the new 
organization with a police force, was not so easily made. It was 
questioned by Secretary Hull in a 1943 memorandum to President 
Roosevelt raising the possibility that states, at first, might not be 
willing to pledge forces to UN command. He proposed that “in the 
absence of such agreement” the Council should be free to make such 
ad hoc arrangements “as [it] may deem appropriate.”2 
By the time the Charter was finalized in San Francisco, these 
doubts had been swept aside, or repressed, as Articles 42 and 43 were 
adopted with relatively little debate. The drafting committee’s 
Rapporteur merely observed that there was no contention about these 
“draft articles.”3 It simply was assumed that states readily would 
enter into agreements with the Security Council to commit available 
specified forces for service when needed. 
This may seem Panglossian in retrospect, but as a symptom of the 
then-prevalent “optimism,” the U.S. Congress enacted a law which 
authorizes the President: 
 
 1. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), to the Secretary of State 
(Sept. 1, 1944), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1944, 761, 762 (1966). 
 2. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, to President Roosevelt (Dec. 29, 1943): 
Arrangements for Exploratory Discussions on World Security Organization, in 1 FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1944, 614,  620 (1966). 
 3. Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Rapporteur, on Chapter VIII, Section B, U.N. 
Conference on International Organization 3rd Comm., 1st Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. 881, III/3/46, 
reprinted in 12 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 
DOCUMENTS 502, 509 (1945). 
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to negotiate a special agreement with the Security Council . . . 
providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their 
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of 
facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be 
made available to the Security Council on its call for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security in 
accordance with article 43 of the Charter.4 
It all seems so long ago! 
No such negotiations, we know, ever took place: not by the United 
States or by any other nation as the Cold War cooled the impetus for 
globalist solutions. 
What were the consequences for the UN of being built on these 
two wrong assumptions? Were the Charter a static instrument bound 
exclusively to the textually expressed intent of its drafters, the 
profound incapacitation of the Security Council and the absence of a 
stand-by police force might have put paid to the Charter’s collective 
security system. Instead, the system has adapted, specifically by 
uncoupling Article 43 from Article 42 and by broadening the 
authority of states to act in self-defense under Article 51. These 
adaptions, brought about precedent-by-precedent, are worth noting. 
II. COLLECTIVE FORCE WITHOUT ARTICLE FORTY-THREE 
The Korean War was the first example of the Security Council 
resisting aggression by ad hoc collective measures, despite the 
absence of Article 43 forces. The North Koreans launched their 
attack in the night of June 24-25, 1950. Qualifying the situation as a 
threat to international peace, the Secretary-General immediately 
called on the Security Council to determine that the attack was a 
breach of the peace, demand a cessation of hostilities, and impose an 
embargo on all “assistance to the North Korean authorities.”5 He 
proposed that the Council call “upon all Member States to render 
every assistance” in carrying out this plan of action.6 The Council 
 
 4. An Act to Amend The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 81-341, 
63 Stat. 734 (1949) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287 et seq (2000)). 
 5. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473rd mtg. at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (1950). 
 6. Id. at 4. 
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adopted this proposal swiftly7 due to the fortuitous absence of its 
Soviet member. It determined that there had been a “breach of the 
peace” and thereby invoked Article 39, the prerequisite for collective 
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. By June 25, 1950 with 
only Yugoslavia opposed, the Council passed a resolution asking 
“that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to 
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack 
and to restore international peace and security in the area.”8 On July 
7, 1950 with the Soviets still absent and abstentions by Egypt, India, 
and Yugoslavia, the Council recommended that all members 
providing military assistance make such forces available to a unified 
military command headed by the United States. The Council 
authorized the command to use the UN flag and requested the United 
States to report “as appropriate” to the Security Council.9 
Since the Charter makes no provision for a UN military response 
other than with Article 43 forces, the Council was creatively adapting 
the text by authorizing action in its name by the United States and 
other national contingents in what became known as a “coalition of 
the willing.” 
Subsequently, authorization of such coalitions of the willing has 
become an established part of UN practice. In 1990, forty years after 
the Korean war, the Security Council—still lacking an article 43-
based military capability of its own—again authorized a massive 
coalition of the willing to undertake operation “Desert Storm” after 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. This began in August when, with all 
permanent members voting in favor and only Yemen abstaining, the 
Council found that Iraq’s action constituted a breach of the peace.10 
By November, it invoked Chapter VII and requested member states 
to “use all necessary means” to reverse Iraqi aggression. This 
resolution passed with only Cuba and Yemen opposed and with 
China abstaining.11 
 
 7. The proposal was adopted June 25, 1950. Id. 
 8. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950). 
 9. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950). 
 10. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 
(1990). 
 11. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 
(1990). 
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Somalia was the next instance of the Council exercising its 
adapted power to deploy military forces. On November 30, 1992 the 
Secretary-General informed the Council that “the situation in Somalia 
has deteriorated beyond the point at which it is susceptible to peace-
keeping treatment.” Accordingly, he reported, “I am more than ever 
convinced of the need for international military personnel to be 
deployed.” He concluded that:  
the Security Council now has no alternative but to decide to 
adopt more forceful measures to secure the humanitarian 
operations . . . . It would therefore be necessary for the 
Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of 
the Charter that a threat to the peace exists . . . . The Council 
would also have to determine that non-military measures as 
referred to in Chapter VII were not capable of giving effect to 
the Council’s decision.12  
Promptly, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, authorized 
the United States and any others willing to “use all necessary means” 
through an ad hoc Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to achieve the 
objectives specified in the Council resolution.13 This was adopted 
unanimously. On March 26, 1993 the Council, again acting under 
Chapter VII, authorized the replacement of the essentially American 
force of 37,000 with a multinational coalition of the willing without 
direct U.S. participation to carry out an expanded peace and security 
mandate, the expanded United Nations in Somalia (UNOSOM II).14 
Another example of this genre was the Council’s “exceptional” 
authorization, in 1994, of a multinational force under “unified 
command and control” to “use all necessary means to facilitate the 
departure from Haiti of the military leadership” that had overthrown 
its democratically elected government.15 On this occasion, the 
 
 12. Letter from the Secretary-General, to the President of the Security Council (Nov. 29, 
1992), 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1992/24868. 
 13. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 63, 64, U.N. Doc. S/RES/497 
(1992). 
 14. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 
(1993). 
 15. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 
(1994). 
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resolution was passed by a vote of 13-0, with Brazil and China 
abstaining. 
Yet another instance of this adapted power was the mandate given 
by the Security Council to another ad hoc “coalition of the willing,” 
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),16 in the former 
Yugoslavia. Its mandate was gradually extended to include the 
defense of Bosnian “safe areas.”17 When those safe areas and the UN 
personnel in them came under attack, air strikes by NATO were 
deployed against Serb heavy weapons. This cooperation between 
UNPROFOR forces deployed in Yugoslavia, under the direction of 
the Secretary-General, and NATO’s air and naval command was 
authorized by the Security Council18 in a resolution of June 4, 1992 
which called for close coordination between the Secretary-General 
and NATO air power19—the “double key” approach. This approach 
was later extended to operations in Croatia.20 In 1997 the Security 
Council, with only the abstention of China, authorized a “protection 
force” to restore order in Albania.21 
In both the Haitian and Yugoslav instances, the respective 
Security Council resolutions were adopted unanimously, validating 
the conclusion that creative adaption of the Charter effectively had 
introduced a new form of collective security based on ad hoc 
“coalitions of the willing,” including the authorization by the Council 
of regional force. The Security Council confirmed this conclusion 
while stretching the precedents a bit further in 1997, by retroactively 
authorizing the armed forces (ECOMOG) of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take military 
measures to end the carnage of the Liberian Civil War.22 The term 
 
 16. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3055th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 
(1992). 
 17. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 
(1993). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. S.C. Res. 958, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3461st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/958  
(1994). 
 21. S.C. Res. 1101, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3758th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1101 
(1997); S.C. Res. 1114, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3791st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1114 
(1997). 
 22. S.C. Res. 1116, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3793rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1116 
(1997). This resolution establishes a UN observer presence in Liberia alongside ECOMOG 
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“retroactively” is used to highlight an important further development: 
that the Council ratified unauthorized regional use of force after it 
had already begun to operate. 
III. THE VIABILITY OF ARTICLE FIFTY-ONE 
The failure to realize the aims of Article 43 caused the Charter 
system to invent an alternative: the “coalition of the willing” 
authorized by the Council to use force collectively. 
An additional important adaption of the Charter was dictated by 
changes in the way aggression came to be committed in the post-
World War Two era. By the terms of Article 51, the Charter 
envisaged that states, individually or through treaty-based regional or 
mutual-defense systems, would defend themselves against an armed 
attack until such time as the UN, acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, could deploy Article 43 forces to combat the aggression. Not 
only were Article 43 forces not forthcoming, but neither were the 
sorts of conventional armed attacks visualized by Article 51. Thus the 
right of self-defense, just as it had became more important due to the 
system’s failure to provide its promised collective security, also 
became more problematic as it was limited, textually, to responses to 
traditional armed attacks. 
Three developments threatened to make this part of the Charter 
system unworkable. One was the virtual tactical replacement of 
military aggression with surrogate warfare, waged indirectly by 
subversion and covert foreign intervention in civil wars. This was not 
the kind of traditional “armed attack” against which the “inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense” was designed to provide 
protection. 
The second development featured the transformation of weaponry 
to instruments of overwhelming and instant destruction. These 
brought into question the conditionality of Article 51, which limits 
states’ exercise of the right of self-defense to the aftermath of an 
 
forces and “[n]ote[s] with appreciation the active efforts of ECOWAS to restore peace, security, 
and stability to Liberia, and commend[s] those African states have and continue to contribute to 
ECOMOG . . . .” For a similar endorsement of ECOMOG deployment in Sierra Leone, see S.C. 
Res. 1162, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3872nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (1998). 
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armed attack. Inevitably, first strike capabilities begat a doctrine of 
“anticipatory self-defense,” for which the literal text of the Charter 
made no provision. 
The third new development is the most difficult to assess. 
Undoubtedly, however, a new ethos had begun to develop that 
challenged traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty. Article 
2(7)’s promise that the UN will not intervene in matters “essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” began to be tested 
against changing perceptions of sovereignty and new concepts of 
human rights. A doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” began to 
emerge in practice, for which the Charter provides no literal textual 
support. 
These unanticipated circumstances have led the Charter system to 
confront new and controversial “interpretations” of the right of states 
to use armed force in the absence of Security Council authorization. 
IV. SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ANTICIPATED AND INDIRECT 
AGGRESSION 
Of particular difficulty in light of subsequent developments is the 
requirement in Article 51 that the “inherent right of self defense” can 
only be exercised “if an armed attack occurs against a member state.” 
It was the United States that had insisted on inserting this phrase. 
Green Hackworth, the State Department’s legal adviser, was alarmed 
that this language “greatly qualified the right of self-defense,” but 
Governor Harold Stassen, deputy head of delegation at San 
Francisco, refused to yield, insisting “that this was intentional and 
sound. We did not want exercised the right of self-defense before an 
armed attack had occurred.”23 When another member of the U.S. 
delegation, Mr. Gates, “posed a question as to our freedom under this 
provision in case a fleet had started from abroad against an American 
republic, but had not yet attacked,” Governor Stassen replied that “we 
could not under this provision attack the fleet but we could send a 
 
 23. Minutes of the Forty-Eighth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States 
Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Sunday, May 20, 1945, 12 Noon, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1945, 813, 818 (1967). 
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fleet of our own and be ready in case an attack came.”24 
The exchange illustrates how little the contemporary advances in 
the technology of war had informed the thinking of the Charter’s 
drafters, making it necessary for the Charter to respond in practice to 
these challenging transformations. In San Francisco, the founders 
deliberately closed the door to any claim of “anticipatory self-
defense,” but that posture was soon challenged by the exigencies of a 
new age of nuclear warheads and long-range rocketry. 
It has been asserted that the emergence of “new age” weaponry 
makes it illogical to require states to sit still until an “armed attack” 
against them has occurred. Where the state is small and the potential 
attacker powerful or equipped with a “first strike capability,” there is 
verisimilitude to the claim that Article 51 should be interpreted to 
allow anticipatory self-defense. This may even have been 
acknowledged tacitly by the UN when, after Israel’s “preventive” 
attack on Egypt in 1956, it did not criticize this action but rather 
authorized the stationing of UN peacekeepers along a line that left 
Israel temporarily in occupation of much of the Sinai. Israel again 
made reference to anticipatory self-defense in 1967. And again, the 
UN “in its debates in the summer of 1967, apportioned no blame for 
the outbreak of fighting and specifically refused to condemn the 
exercise of self-defense by Israel.”25 This time, Israel remained in 
occupation of most of the Sinai until a peace treaty with Egypt was 
negotiated. 
Similar claims to use force in anticipatory self-defense were made 
by the United States in 1962 when it imposed a naval quarantine on 
Cuba to compel the removal of Soviet missiles said to pose an 
immediate threat to American security,26 and again in 1986 when 
U.S. aircraft attacked bases in Libya allegedly used for terrorist 
attacks on its citizens abroad.27 Indeed, even the International Court 
 
 24. Minutes of the Thirty-Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San 
Francisco, Monday, May 14, 1945, 9:05 a.m., in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1945, 707, 709 (1967). 
 25. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (1977). 
 26. Pres. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Proclamation 3504: Interdiction of the Delivery of 
Offensive Weapons to Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 512 (1963). 
 27. Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 612, 632 (1986). 
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has been ambiguous about the use of force in situations of supreme 
provocation. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, it was unable to decide 
definitively whether an otherwise unlawful act—recourse to nuclear 
weapons in anticipatory self-defense—would be lawful if the very 
existence of the state were threatened. 
These instances pose an intractable dilemma. On the one hand, it 
is evident that any adaption of the Charter’s absolute prohibitions on 
the unilateral or initiatory use of armed force would be nullified if 
each state were free to determine for itself whether a perceived 
danger of attack warrants anticipatory action. On the other hand, law 
that seeks to prohibit a state from protecting its very survival until the 
threat to it has eventuated is irrational and ineffectual. 
This dilemma cannot be resolved in the abstract. Formulating an 
applicable principle may be easy, but the devil is in its application: 
how to make—credibly and impartially—the key determination that, 
in a particular instance, extreme necessity does or does not exist, so 
as to justify a military action? Who shall decide and on what facts? 
Even traditional deference to U.S. Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster’s opinion in the arbitration arising out of the 1837 Caroline 
incident28 does not go far to resolve the problem of its application to 
an infinite variety of factual situations in the absence of mandatory 
recourse to an impartial judge or jury. In seeking a resolution of this 
hiatus, it is less important to fine-tune the legal formula than to agree 
on institutions and procedures for getting the facts speedily and 
correctly, on which to base a sensible systemic response to the claim 
to have acted in “anticipatory self-defense.” 
Even more troublesome is the question whether force in self-
defense may be used against indirect aggression by one state or its 
surrogates. Indirect aggression includes the fomenting of civil war by 
one state in another state, or supporting the export of insurgency, 
subversion, and terrorism. It includes acts perhaps analogous to, but 
 
 28. Webster considered that there had to be a “necessity of self-defense, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation,” and that the act 
should involve “nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the necessity of 
self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.” See ROBERT 
JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 420-27 (9th ed. 1992). 
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not factually the same as, the conventional armed attack envisaged by 
the self-defense provision of the Charter. 
With the beginning of the Cold War—inhibited by a nuclear 
balance of terror but otherwise unconstrained in zealotry—some 
states saw “surrogate warfare” as the best means to spread their 
influence and ideology. With the end of the Cold War, other states 
have felt freer to emulate this tactic. 
Increasingly, states claiming to be the victim of indirect or 
surrogate aggression have sought recourse under the right of self-
defense in Article 51. This sometimes has taken the form of an armed 
response against the state from which the indirect or surrogate attack 
is said to originate. In its controversial and deeply divided decision in 
Nicaragua v. U.S.A., the International Court of Justice appeared to 
uphold the right of a state subject to indirect aggression to receive 
military support in collective self-defense, but not its right to 
intervene militarily against the state from which the surrogate 
aggression was launched or supported.29 The case also underscored 
the importance of basing any principled decision in any particular 
case on a credible assessment of the facts—something the UN system 
is not always well-equipped to provide. 
Despite the court’s Nicaragua ruling, the practice of intervening 
militarily in a country from which interventions emanate becomes 
increasingly tolerated practice. Turkey has occupied base areas in 
Iraq used by Turkish Kurds to fight for their independence. Russia 
has threatened to attack Afghanistani bases that support Chechen 
rebels. These events have passed with little or no comment at the UN, 
a sharp break with the vigorous condemnation that had earlier met 
Israeli occupation of PLO base areas in Lebanon. 
Perhaps this growing tolerance is as it should be. Why should a 
state under attack from abroad by terrorists or insurgents supported 
by a foreign state grant those forces immunity in a so-called “safe 
haven”? When, after hundreds of persons were killed in the bombing 
of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, the 
United States launched retaliatory strikes against Osama bin-Laden’s 
base in Afghanistan and a factory near Khartoum, there was scarcely 
 
 29. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at ¶¶ 232, 249 
(June 27). 
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any criticism and no recourse to the UN. On the other hand, while 
there may be support for the principle behind such actions, again the 
devil is in its contextual application. If admitted, how is the principle 
to be kept from becoming a license for every state taking the law into 
its own hands—no matter how flimsy its evidence of wrongdoing? 
It is not merely new agreed upon principles that appear to be 
needed, but rather an effective, credible process for their 
implementation: a way to distinguish those instances where a state’s 
recourse to force is factually and contextually justified and those 
where it is not. A white-knuckled insistence on the letter of the law 
embodied in Article 51 will lead to ever-greater disrespect for an 
obsolete principle. On the other hand, relaxation of Article 51’s 
absolutism would be very dangerous to world peace unless new 
principles are not only agreed upon, but a process is instituted for 
these principles to be applied credibly. We shall return to this matter 
after examining the third recent development challenging strict 
construction of Article 51. 
V. THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ISSUE 
The UN system has not been oblivious to the fact that not all 
violations of Article 51—that is, resorts to armed force that were 
neither provoked by a direct armed attack nor authorized by the 
Security Council—are precisely the same. This is evidenced by the 
significant variation from case to case of the international system’s 
reaction—the degree of approbation or disapprobation—when states 
have claimed to be acting in a reconfigured version of self-defense. In 
practice, the reactions of the system have varied across a broad 
spectrum. Benign silence greeted Tanzania’s ouster of Idi Amin’s 
brutal regime in Uganda, France’s intervention against the mad 
Emperor Bokassa of the Central African “Empire,” and America’s air 
strike against the Sudan and Afghanistan after the destruction of U.S. 
embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi by the forces of Osama bin-
Laden. The UN system appears tacitly to have accepted the need for 
allied intervention in northern Iraq in 1991-92 to save the Kurdish 
population, even though textually required authorization by the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/7
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Security Council was not then forthcoming.30 Instead the UN, in 
effect, stepped in after the unauthorized allied military intervention 
had compelled Iraq to agree to the positioning of 500 UN guards to 
protect the local population’s access to humanitarian efforts on their 
behalf.31 Mild formal reprimand greeted Israel’s incursions into 
Uganda to rescue hijacked passengers at Entebbe and into Argentina 
to seize the war criminal, Eichmann. India’s intervention in 
Bangladesh got off with a light reprimand. 
On the other hand, there was fulsome condemnation of the 
Soviets’ invasion of Hungary, and U.S. occupation of Grenada. For 
years the UN steadfastly refused to recognize the results of the use of 
force by Vietnam in Cambodia, and still will not legitimate the 
military presence of Turkey in Cyprus. The UN system clearly 
refused to legitimate the use of force by Indonesia in East Timor or 
by Morocco in the Western Sahara. 
Thus, it can be argued that the UN system, far from literally and 
mechanically applying Article 51 to each of these cases, has made a 
carefully nuanced analysis of each. Perhaps the system 
unselfconsciously has been reworking the Charter text to conform to 
a less rigid principle and is seeking to apply this adapted version of 
the applicable principle on a case-by-case basis, informed by the 
context and the facts as much as by an abstract normative concept. 
Where would a more contextually sensitive adaption of Article 51 
lead? That question arises most starkly in the context of humanitarian 
intervention. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has captured the essence of this 
tension between an intolerably inflexible principle and the equally 
intolerable carte blanche that might result were the inflexible rule 
simply abandoned without any new checks and balances in place. 
The issue arises unavoidably out of NATO’s action in Kosovo. 
Annan remarked on this profound dilemma: 
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of the 
 
 30. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 
(1991). The resolution, passed April 5, 1991, while condemning Iraqi repression of the Kurds, 
does not authorize the military action by allied powers. 
 31. Carl-August Fleischhauer, Remarks at the Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law (April 4, 1992) (on file with author). 
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international order is the use of force in the absence of a 
Security Council mandate, one might ask, not in the context of 
Kosovo but in the context of Rwanda, if, in those dark days 
and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of states had 
been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did 
not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a 
coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold? 
 To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era 
when States and groups of States can take military action 
outside the established mechanisms for enforcing international 
law, one might ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions 
undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system 
created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous 
precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to 
decide who might invoke these precedents and in what 
circumstances?32 
VI. IS THERE LIGHT AT THE END OF THIS DILEMMA? 
One possible answer based on the actual practice of UN organs is 
that the UN system already tolerates, ultimately cooperates with, and 
may even commend military action by states when such action is 
taken to avert a demonstrable catastrophe. The kind of catastrophe is 
relatively easily answered in principle; the principle being derived 
from the actual responses of the UN system to such uses of 
unauthorized force. 
 The system has responded benevolently when anticipatory force 
has been used solely to prevent a demonstrably imminent and 
potentially overwhelming threat to a state’s security. It has also 
responded benevolently when unauthorized force is used solely to 
contain or end a state’s instigation of, or tolerance for, indirect 
aggression. Finally, the system has responded benevolently to the use 
of unauthorized force solely for the purpose of preventing a major 
humanitarian catastrophe. 
“The system responded benevolently” means either specific 
 
 32. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999). 
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consent or silent acquiescence. The Security Council or General 
Assembly have approved ex post facto the previously unauthorized 
use of force (as in the instance of ECOMOG’s intervention in 
Liberia). The Council has defeated resoundingly a vote of censure of 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.33 Both the Council and Assembly 
have avoided censure of the unauthorized use of force by Israel in its 
preemptive strike against Egypt in 1967, of the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus in 1974, of Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in 1979, and of the 
U.S. bombing of Osama bin-Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan 
in 1998. These instances of benevolent response contrast eloquently 
with the systemic condemnation of uses of force that were not 
considered warranted by the facts and circumstances. Examples 
include the UN system’s unrelenting opposition to the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, to Morocco’s taking of the Western Sahara, and 
to Indonesia’s seizure of East Timor. 
It also may be argued that the system has responded benevolently 
to a use of force if the UN participates positively in its consequences: 
for example, by agreeing to provide the transitional regime for 
Kosovo, or by policing the Green Line created by Turkish 
intervention between ethnic Turks and Greeks in the Cyprus civil 
war. Was the admission of Bangladesh to the UN after Indian troops 
had won its independence not a form of absolution? 
The UN organs have not always acted wisely, of course. It is 
difficult to defend as principled the General Assembly’s ten-year-
long rejection of the credentials of the Government of Cambodia. 
True, that government had been installed by invading forces from 
Vietnam; but it was surely an improvement, in humanitarian terms, 
over the Khmer Rouge. That Vietnam’s use of force violated the 
Charter text is beyond question, but, in the absence of some 
collective remedy under UN auspices, can one really say that the 
world has an interest in defending Cambodian sovereignty even if it 
means the methodical murder of a large part of the Cambodian 
people? What kind of principle is that? Must the system always give 
preference to its rule against recourse to force over the emergent rules 
of humanitarian law and human rights? Juries sometimes get it 
 
 33. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (1999). 
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wrong, especially in close cases where the facts are inadequately 
represented. Of note in Vietnam’s defense of its action before UN 
organs is its government’s reticence in presenting evidence of Khmer 
Rouge atrocities, perhaps because its invasion was even then 
installing a former Khmer Rouge commander as Cambodia’s new 
ruler. 
If a sort of consensus is emerging around the principles applicable 
to defense against egregious instances of several kinds of aggression 
not adequately covered by Article 51’s concept of an “armed attack,” 
who should apply these principles? Is it acceptable to leave their 
case-by-case application to the “jury” that is the Security Council or 
the General Assembly? It is clear that they already have the authority 
under the Charter to perform this jurying function. In the words of 
Professor Rosalyn Higgins: “[I]t has come to be accepted almost as a 
matter of principle that the authority to decide upon disputed 
questions of the interpretation of the Charter belongs to the organ 
charged with their application.”34 Thus, it is “significant that at the 
San Francisco Conference the proposal to confer the point of 
preliminary determination [of jurisdiction] upon the International 
Court of Justice was rejected.”35 
Instead, two key questions were left to be solved primarily by the 
political organs: whether a matter is beyond the UN’s jurisdiction 
because it is “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of states 
and whether, consequently, the UN is barred from taking a proposed 
action because to do so would violate the requirement not to 
“intervene” in such matters. “[S]uffice it to say,” Higgins concludes, 
“that the political organs of the United Nations have clearly regarded 
themselves entitled to determine their own competence.”36 Moreover, 
she adds, these interpretations of the Charter are made by the political 
organ not through a formal decision but as a merged, or even 
submerged, part of its “decisions on the matter at issue, and often . . . 
 
 34. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 66 (1963). 
 35. Id. at 66 n.27 (discussing the failure of a Greek proposal to give sole competenz-
competenz which secured 14-17 support, but not the necessary two-thirds majority needed to 
amend the draft); see also Leich, supra note 27. 
 36. HIGGINS, supra note 34, at 66-67. 
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by implication.”37 While under Article 96 of the Charter the 
International Court may be asked to render an advisory opinion, 
Higgins stresses that judicial “consultation is not obligatory”38 and 
resort to it has been infrequent. 
More often than not, the political organs of the UN have 
interpreted the Charter sensibly but, in the words of the Privy 
Council, as if it were “a living tree,”39 capable of adapting to 
changing circumstances.  
Another thing that may be said about the record of the Council 
and Assembly in applying the Charter to unauthorized uses of force is 
that decisions are affected profoundly, if not always decisively, by 
the quality of the information available to those bodies. The 
Council’s firm response to North Korea’s invasion of the South was 
facilitated by a report of the Secretary-General40 based on first-hand 
reporting by a UN team present in Seoul. By way of contrast, the 
reporting on conditions in Kosovo leading up to the NATO strike was 
less satisfactory, the UN-sponsored OECD mission to Kosovo having 
been withdrawn.41 
It may be that Russia or China would have vetoed collective 
military action against Yugoslavia even had the Secretary-General 
been in a position to present a credible, timely assessment of the 
humanitarian crisis. But the costs of casting such a veto would have 
been very high. Moreover, in such an event, the NATO states might 
have been better positioned to take their case to the General 
Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure.42 
 
 37. HIGGINS, supra note 34, at 66-67. 
 38. HIGGINS, supra note 34, at 67. 
 39. Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136 (P.C.). 
 40. U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473rd Mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1496 (1950). 
 41. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 
(1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 
(1998); Letter from the Secretary-General, to the President of the Security Council (Mar. 25, 
1999), U.N. Doc. S/1999/338 (1999) (notifying withdrawal of Kosovo Verification Mission). 
 42. G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 
(1950). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Charter system has proven resilient in the face of changing 
fundamental circumstances to which it has learned to adapt. It is the 
practice of the principal organs—the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, and the Secretary-General, sometimes aided by the 
Court—that has helped it adapt. 
Reading the practice of these organs, it is possible to conclude that 
the use of force by a state or regional or mutual-defense system is 
likely to be tolerated if there is credible evidence that such first-use 
was justified by the severe impact of another state’s indirect 
aggression or by clear evidence of an impending, planned, and 
decisive attack by a state or by an egregious and potentially 
calamitous violation of humanitarian law by a government against its 
own population or a part of it. 
Even if there appears to be a high level of agreement as to these 
emerging general principles, the more difficult challenge is to apply 
them, case-by-case, to the specifics of each crisis. There is no 
realistic alternative to the Council and Assembly as the global juries. 
True, the jurors are not all disinterested, unbiased citizens of the 
world community. But neither are they, or most of them, blind to 
credible evidence—evidence of states party to a crisis on their own 
behalf and evidence adduced by an augmented system of fact-finding 
reporting to the political organs through the Secretary-General. Most 
governments do respond to clear and unimpeachable evidence of the 
facts and of their sociopolitical context. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/7
p 51 Franck.doc  12/20/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] Military Force Without Security Council Authorization 69 
 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 51 Franck.doc  12/20/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 5:51 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/7
p 51 Franck.doc  12/20/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] Military Force Without Security Council Authorization 71 
 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
